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Abstract
This report presents the resu]ts of Failure Modes
and Effects Analysis (FMEA) conducted for the Wlnd Tur-
bine Generators. The FMEA was performed for the func-
tional modes of each system, subsystem, or component.
The single-point failures were eliminated for most of
the systems. The blade system was the on]y exception.
The qualitative probability of a blade separatlng was
estimated at Level D-remote.
Many changes were made to the hardware as a result
of this analysis. The most significant change was the
addition of the safety system. Operational experlence
and need to improve machine availability have resulted
in subsequent changes to the various systems which are
also reflected in this FMEA.
Introduction
The NASA Lewis Research Center conducted research
and development of large horizontal axis wind Turbine
Generators for the Department of Energy as one phase of
the overall Wind Energy Program. Nlnd turblnes ranglng
in size from lO0 to 3200 kN were designed and built as
part of this program. The object of the program was to
develop wind turbines which would generate electricity
at a cost which is competitive with alternative gener-
ating methods, particularly oii.
Thls paper descrlbes some of the changes that
resulted from using the Failure Modes and Effects Anal-
ysls (FMEA) as a systems safety and reliability analy-
sis tool for the 200 kN, MOP OA Wlnd Turbine Generators
(WTG). Reference l further describes the 1ogle for
this approach. This analysis was orlglnaIIy done by
the Rellability and Quality Assurance Office at NASA
Lewis Research Center. Later, the government con-
tracted with W.L. Tanksley and Associates to revise and
update their analysis.
The complete FMEA resulted in several modifica-
tions to the original MOD OA WTG design. These inc]uded
changes to the microprocessor (hardware and software),
the safety system, the yaw system, the drive train, the
supervisory system and the electrical system. The
analysis was limited to a level of detail that would
assure safe, rellable, machine operation. The MOD DA
portion of the program has now been completed and the
machines have been removed.
Machine Description
A photograph of one MOD-OA machine, located on
Culebra Island, Puerto Rico, is shown as Fig. I.
Nearly identical machines were located In Clayton, New
Mexico, Block Island, Rhode Island, and Oahu, Hawail.
The blades measured 125 ft, tip-to-tip. The hub center
was lO0 ft above ground level. The blades rotated at
40 rpm. The blades were mounted on the rotor hub, as
shown in the cutaway drawing included as Fig. 2. The
pitch actuator pitched the blades through a set of bevel
gears located inside the hub. The hub was attached to
a low-speed shaft which was connected to a speed
increaser gearbox. A fluid coupling, attached to the
1800 rpm output shaft of the gearbox helped dampen out
power oscillations. A high-speed shaft then transmit-
ted power to V-belts which drove a synchronous alterna-
tor. The machine was housed in an 8-ft diameter nacelle,
C-78-287(_
FIGURE I. -MOD OA WIND TURBINEAT CULEBRA ISLAND,PUERTORICO.
MOD-OA 200 KW WIND TURBINE
SCHEMATICOF NACELLE INTERIOR
FlUID COUPLING_
ANEMOMETER/WINDVANE-
V-BELTS"
HYDRAULIC "
SUPPLY-__
ALTERNATORr
/'r P ITCH
GEAR ;DISK BRAKE ,ACTUATOR,
i Box " .....
} t +" " t/ 'L"_
_BEDPLATE R '
_l_IF'-- ]/6 RPM OTOR
• __'_"_,'-YAWBRAKE BLADES
DR1VE
FIGURE2. , CUTAWAYDRAWINGOF TOWERMOUNTEDEQUIPMENT.
ORIGINAL PAGE
BLACK AND WHITE PHOTOGRAPH
nacelle, mounted on a turntable bearing located on top
of a truss tower. A dual yaw drive system kept the
machine aligned with the wind.
The wind turbine was controlled by a microoroces-
sor, two closed loop servo systems, and a safety sys-
tem. It continually monitored machine status and wind
conditions. When the wind speed reached 12 mph, the
microprocessor signaled the pitch controller to start
pitching the blades, gradually increasing rotor speed.
When the alternator reached synchronous speed, the
alternator was synchronized with the utility grid.
After synchronizatlon, the blades remained in the full
power position, generating increasing power as the
winds increased until the full output of 200 kW was
reached at a wind speed of 24 mph. As winds increased
further, the blades gradually feathered, spilling some
of the wlnd, to maintain the 200 kW output.
If the wlnd speed dropped below 10 mph, the
machine was shut down. If the wind speed increased
above 40 mph, the machine was shut down to avoid high-
blade loads. When the wind speed dropped back to
35 mph, the machine was restarted. The microprocessor
also monitored several noncritical variables to shut
the machine down if necessary.
The first closed loop servo system regulated the
pitch of the blades. Blade pitch regulated machine
speed from initial blade rotation until synchronization
with the utility grid and regu]ated the power generated
after synchronization. The second closed loop servo
measured the difference between the actual wind direc-
tion and the nacelle direction to keep the machine
aligned with the wind. The machine operated with the
b]ades downwind and was kept aligned within 15 ° of the
wind dlrection.
The safety system, as the name Implies, measured
several operating varlables, shutting the machine down
If any of these variables went out of limits. These
variables included overspeed, overcurrent, pneumatic
and hydraulic pressures, several overtemperatures, and
hlgh vibration. The Safety System shutdown signal
directly shut the machine down, regardless of what the
microprocessor or servo controllers were doing.
The machines were modified as operating experience
was accumulated. The most prominent modiflcatlons
were:
I. Different blade materials
2. Different rotational speeds
3. Control system upgrades with two servo ]pops
4. Incorporating several safety functions in the
microprocessor loop.
The FMEA was used to study these changes and
upgraded to include the final design.
Combined rHEA Procedure
Numerous relia0ility, quality assurance and system
safety techniques were considered. A FMEA, preliminary
hazards analysis, and operations hazard analysis are
very similar and many of the form entries are the same.
The modified FMEA was chosen to be the main tool for
listing and analyzing each component for the various
possible failure modes. On some previous projects, one
person or team has simultaneously reviewed the hardware
for a system safety and a reliability analysis, see
Ref. 2. The results have been listed on a sample FMEA
form, see Fig. 3. Each system was studied for 0ossible
failure modes, causes, and effects on the machine reli-
ability as well as on personnel safety. The necessary
corrective action was then determined independently.
This combined FMEA technique works qulte well and saves
a significant number of manhours.
There is one drawback to this technique. It is
easy to list failures that are not safety problems, but
It is also easy to overlook safety problems which are
not caused by equipment fallures. Some examples of
safety problems which could have been overlooked are
the three listed below:
I. Personnel getting caught in rozating
machinery.
2. Electrical shock hazards due to exposed
terminals.
3. Operating errors.
These safety-related items can also be handled
using the combined FMEA method. The reviewer has to
make a consclous effort to consider each of the hazards
as a posslble failure mode. Hazards would be catego-
rlzed as follows:
I. Lack of proper safeguards in the design.
2. Lack of operator training to follow
procedures.
3. Lack of human engineering causing operator
error.
This FMEA was primarily directed at identifying
those critical failure modes that could be hazardous to
life or could result in major damage to the system.
The analysis was organlzed by systems to held limit the
number of similar entries for similar events that could
occur. The system was analyzed so that no major damage
should occur because of a single-point failure or a
single failure following an undetected failure. The
analysis was qualitative in nature and was used to
determine the cause and effect for each failure mode
and what could be done to correct the problem.
The FMEA was determined for the functional modes
of each system, subsystem, or component. The electri-
cal and electronic portions of the FMEA were limited to
the package level, showing only constant high level
output or zero output. Wlring harnesses, cables, and
electrical connectors were considered to be part of the
output or Input and were not considered separately.
The level of detail In the mechanical portion of
the FMEA varles. For catalog, off-the-shelf components,
only expected types of failures were considered. A
emote-operated valve was considered to be in the failed
open or falled closed position only. Pressure contain-
ment and distribution systems were considered as having
falled when the system pressure had dropped below the
minimum safe operating level. A hand valve was consid-
ered part of the containment system and could fail if
the improper position would not be detected. The more
likely failures, particularly those having severe con-
sequences, were considered for possible redesign or the
addition of redundant components.
Many changes were made to the hardware as a result
of this analysis. The most significant change was the
addition of the Safety System. Operational experience
and the need to improve macnine availabi;ity resulted
in additional changes to the various systems.
Results
While performing the FMEA, it soon became obvious
that the worst possible failure would be significan:
overspeed, since this could result in _hrowing a blade.
The consequences of all of the other _ai!ures were
relatively minor 0y comparison. BaseO on Ibis conclu-
sion, disk brakes were added to the high-speed shaft
very early in the design to stop the rotor, even if the
blades remained in the full power position. The brakes
were designed to activate if electrical power was lost.
It would also have been desirable to have [he Drakes
activate upon loss of brake actuation pressure, but only
one machine was converted before the end of the pro-
gram. The brakes were applied for two main conditions:
1. Overspeed due to failures
2. To hold the blades still for maintenance
The analysis pointed out a number of items that
were to be considered as primary safety devices. The
reliability of these systems had to be maximized. Fac-
tors to be considered in attaining maximum rellability
were: Redundancy, minimum electrica] path, quality of
components and periodic verification of system opera-
tlon. These Items included the following:
SYSTEM: SAFETY SYSTEM - DWG. lOl6Fll, SHEETS 1 & _; I016F12
2.
ITEM
ALARM CIRCUIT
"A"
(DWG. lO]6F11,
SIIEETS] & 3;
I016F12).
EMERGENCY
SHUTDOWN
RESET PB 6.
(DWG.
I016F12).
FAILURE
MOE
IA. INADVERTENT
REMOVAL OF
SIGNAL TO
SSRI.
IB. CIRCUITS FAIL
TO REMOVE
SIGNALS WHEN
SAFETY SEN-
SORS SIGNAL
PROBLEM,
2A. FALLS OPEN.
2B. FAIIS CLOSED.
CAHSE
I. ELECIRONIC
FAILURE.
2. SWITCH
ELECTRICAl
OR MECHAN-
ICA4 FAIL-
URE
EFFECT
IA.
]B.
2A.
2B.
NO START OR EMERGENCY SHUT-
DOWN. REMOVING S;GNAI FROM
SOLID SIATE RELAY 1 (:;SRI)
DE ENERGIZES RELAY Kl WHICH
DE-ENERGIZES RELAY K2. DE-
ENERGIZING K2 OPENS C_2, RE
MOVES THE GENERAIOR FIEID,
FEATHERS BLADES AND IJRNS
OFF THE PITCH HYDRAULIC PUMP.
LOSE PRIMARY SAFEIY EYSTEM.
THE FOLLOWING SENSOR_ ACT
DIRECTLY AND REMA[N ACTIVE:
VSIA V[BRATION
PSIA FEAIIIER BOIILE PRESSURE
PS2A BRAKE BOTTLE PR_SSIJRE
0%1 OVERSPEED SWIICH
0552 OVERSPEED SWIICII
ftHP PITCH PUMPPR[SSURE
NO RESET IN THE EVEN1 OF AN
EMERGENCY SHUTDOWN.
NO FFFECT UNlit EMERGENCY
SIIUTDOWNOCCURS. LOGIC GATES
LATCH tIPAND WILL NO_ R[SCT.,
IF BOTH CONTACTS FAil CLOSED,
SHUTDOWN WILL NOT LATCH EX-
CEPT THROUGH MICROPROCESSOR.
2.
CORRECTIVE
ACTION
NONE REQUIRED
REPAIR AS
NECESSARY
IB.
NONE REQUIRED
REPAIR AS
NECESSARY.
RE/'_ARKS
PERIODIC
CHECKOUT
REQUIRED.
FIGURE 3. SAt_PLEPAGE FROM MOD OA WIND TURBINE FMEA.
a 45 rpm overspeed
b Low-speed shaft vibrations
c Emergency feather pressure
d Rotor brake pressure
e Yaw error signal
f Alternator overcurrent
g Alternator reverse current
The next problem that surfaced resulted from the
basic design of the machine. The Safety System was
located ]n the control building at ground level. Most
of the sensors were located in the machine nacelle on
top of the tower. Since the machine must yaw to stay
in alignment with the wind. the signals were routed
through slip rings. The FMEA analysis revealed some
potential failures in the slip rings (snorts or opens,
depending on circuitry) that could override or bypass
a Safety System shutdown signal. As a result, several
redundant sensors were added in the nacelle that acted
totally within the nacelle and did not rely on the slip
rings for a shutdown signal path. In fact, they were
designed to shut the machine down regardless of what
signals the microprocessor was sending to the machine.
These sensors included overspeed, low-speed shaft
vlbratlon switches, low-blade emergency feather pres-
sure, and low-rotor brake pressure.
Alignment of the machlne with the wind was also
Important. The direction of the nacelle was compared
to the wind dlrection to keep the machine aligned with
the wind. The FMEA pointed out the need for a redun-
dant yaw error signal, which was added.
There was concern that an intruder would go up
into the nacelle and get caught in the rotating machin-
ery. The only access route up into the nacelle was by
using an open elevator-type device, When the elevator
was not being used, the power was turned off from
inside the control room and interlocked with the safety
system.
Conclusions
The performance of the FNEA for the 200 kW Mind
Turbine Generator accomplished several oojectives. I_S
iS Usually the case with this type of tool, the act of
performing a systematic, detailed review of the design
was very useful. The FMEA indicated the need _or a
number of design changes:
1 O]_k brakes on high s_eed sha#:
2 Prima-y safety devices
a. Oversseed
b. Vibration
c. Fe:_:her pressure
d. Sra_e pres;ure
e. Yaw error
f. Alternator over/reverse current
3 Redundant sensors
4 Intruder alarm
The final FMEA a]so gave project management per-
sonnel a qualitative ]ndicaticn of the degree of pro-
gram and safety risk that they were accepting w]th
this design.
Since this was an evolutionary R&D project, there
were a large number of changes proposed for the machine.
With the completed FMEA, it was easy to review the
safety and reliability implications of each proposed
change. By using this technique, it was shown that the
increased safety and reliability risk of some of the
proposed changes did not justify the change. Most of
the proposed changes did not increase the risk and in
some cases, decreased the risk. Finally, the FMEA was
revised to reflect all approved changes.
In summary, the FMEA performed for this project
served several very useful functions. The benefits
far outweigheJ the cost of performing the FMEA.
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